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This essay provides a brief institutional and structural account of the history and context of 
retransmission fees and the revenues they generate in the television industry. We argue that 
commodity formations within the television industry are broader, and more nuanced, than the sale 
of audiences (power, data, ratings, etc.) to advertisers.  Despite widespread technological and 
economic shifts, the notion of the commodity audience still possesses a great deal of explanatory 
power in relation to contemporary media industries. The audience commodity has been, and will 
continue to be, a powerful force in the decision making and revenue streams of television, but new 
technologies such as streaming, IPTV, and direct subscription models have expanded the economic 
avenues available to capital within the television markets. Retransmission fees have figured 
prominently in shaping and constraining the contemporary television industry, granting 
programmers greater control over distribution and providing a profitable path forward for capital 
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N July of 2019 Nexstar Media Group blacked out 120 stations in 97 markets from DirecTV. 
The cause for the blackout, which left millions of subscribers without access to network 
content and cut-off networks from access to commodity audiences, was a dispute over 
retransmission fees. These fees are payments from multichannel video programming distributors 
(MVPD), such as Comcast, Time Warner, AT&T, etc., to television programmers (e.g. CBS, 
ESPN, TNT) for the rights to distribute that programmer’s content on a cable system. In the 
event that a rights fee is not agreed between the parties, a blackout occurs and the network is 
unavailable on a MVPD network.  Blackouts have become increasingly common – there were 8 
in 2010 and there have thus far been 230 in 2019 – as retransmission fees have become a 
powerful economic force in the television industry (Farrell 2019).  Networks, MVPD, and capital 
markets have all taken notice of the lucrative retransmission market and reconfigured business 
models to take advantage of this new revenue source.  From a critical perspective, retransmission 
fees have reshaped the television industry and emerged as another mechanism of capital 
accumulation alongside the commodity audience.  Taking account of these fees is necessary to 
make the structural and institutional trends of the contemporary television industry legible.    
 
Since its inception in the United States, the television industry has been driven by advertiser 
support.  Whether from the programmatic sponsorship of the 1940s and 1950s or the shift to 
standard commercial breaks during programming of the 1960s and onward, television networks 
have financed content by selling something to advertisers. Whether this something is airtime, 
exposure, mindshare, watching power, or attention largely depends on the theoretical and 
professional preference of the observer (Fuchs 2012).  Nonetheless, throughout the early history 
of television advertising has been at the forefront of the capitalization of the medium.  The 
emergence of cable and satellite technologies expanded the means by which individuals could 
access television content, which in turn spawned markets in 1) the distribution of both television 
signals (subscriptions to multichannel video programming distribution (MVPD) and 2) cable 
network infrastructure.   
 
Cable technologies also opened up new avenues for capital accumulation in a two-layered 
broadcaster market.  The audience-commodity thesis, as articulated by Smythe, remained in 
place as cable audiences were sold to cable advertisers (Smythe 1951, 2006a; Jhally & Livant 
1986a).  The other side of the newly emerging cable television market, established following the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Television Act of 1992 (CTCPTA), is the sale of 
retransmission rights from broadcasters to cable operators and other MVPDs.  The market for 
television content is complicated, multi-layered, and subject to both legal and technological 
shifts.  As Evens (2013) illustrated, television market dyads can be grouped as follows:  
 
Infrastructure (MVPD purchase wire access from Carriers) 
 Subscription (Subscribers purchase access rights from MVPD) 
 Programming (Broadcaster purchases exhibition rights from TV Production Companies) 
 Advertising (Advertisers purchase access to audiences from Broadcasters) 
 Rights Fees (MVPD purchase retransmission/carriage rights from Content Networks) 
 
Traditionally, political economic analysis of the television commodity has focused on the 
advertising market and the sale of audiences/ratings data (Smythe 1977, 2006b; Meehan 2005; 
McChesney 2008; Caraway 2011; Fuchs 2012; McGuigan & Manzerolle 2014).  However, the 
I 
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growing importance of the rights fees market, both in terms of industry structure and capital 
flows, situate these fees as an immensely profitable commodity for content distributors within 
the television market.  Retransmission revenues across broadcast and cable topped $45 billion in 
2017, while in the local television markets retransmission fees contributed $8.44 billion dollars 
to industry revenue in 2018 versus the $19.3 billion generated by advertising (Jacobson 2018).1 
As of 2017, these fees have also constituted more than half of total revenue for a number of cable 
networks, notably news networks such CNN, Fox, and MSNBC (Matsa 2017).  Although the 
audience is still a commodity with the television industry, it is not the only televisual commodity 
warranting critical attention.  Failing to take account of new strategies of accumulation, 
specifically retransmission fees within the television industry will further distance a political 
economic account of mass media from its day-to-day functioning as a tool of capital 
accumulation. 
 
This essay will focus primarily on three industrial sectors of the television market – 
programming networks (NBC, ESPN, Weather Channel), cable distributors/MVPD (Time 
Warner, Comcast, DirecTV) and local broadcast stations or station groups (KTLA, KIVI-ABC, 
Sinclair Broadcasting) – although the majority of the attention will be paid to programmers and 
MVPD.  
 
Approach and Data 
There are two goals in the following essay.  First, to provide a brief institutional and structural 
account of the history and context of retransmission fees and the revenues they generate in the 
television industry.  The second, more speculative, goal is to argue that commodity formations 
within the television industry are broader and more nuanced than the sale of audiences (power, 
data, ratings, etc.) to advertisers.  Despite widespread technological and economic shifts, the 
notion of the commodity audience still possesses a great deal of explanatory power in relation to 
contemporary media industries.  From specific arguments about what constitutes “audience 
labor” (Jhally & Livant 1986b; Shimpach 2005; Caraway 2011; Nixon 2016) to the importance 
of 3rd party ratings agencies (Meehan 1984; Kosterich & Napoli 2016) to the alternative 
formulations and technologies by which audience labor can be commodified (Fuchs 2010; Lee 
2011; Manzerolle 2014) the audience has long been seen as the engine that drives capital 
accumulation in the television industry.  The audience commodity has been, and will continue to 
be, a powerful force in the decision making and revenue streams of television, but newer 
technologies such as streaming, IPTV and direct subscription models have expanded the 
economic avenues available to capital within the television markets.  Retransmission fees have 
figured prominently in shaping and constraining the contemporary television industry, granting 
programmers greater control over distribution and providing a profitable path forward for capital 
looking at new monetization strategies of television content. 
 
Although the audience as a generator of revenue is no doubt important, retransmission fees have 
become a critical part of the television industry – both in terms of capital accumulation and the 
institutional logic of programmers and television distributors.  The two approaches – 
retransmission fees as a logic for changes in the television industry and retransmission fees as a 
mechanism to further the accumulation of capital – correspond to institutional and structural 
levels of analysis, respectively.  Meehan (1986), in encouraging multi-layered approaches, writes 
                                                      
1	See	Appendix	for	channel-by-channel	breakdown	and	overall	figures	
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that “[i]nstitutionalists analyze the invention, innovation, and commercialization of technologies, 
services, and products as attempts to extend control over more of old territory, to retrench when 
control is threatened, or to invade new territory,” whereas structuralist analysis “locate[s] 
explanations in the meshing and grinding together of organizations, systems, sectors, and 
domains [ideology, politics, economy]” (1986, 398, 401).  In this case, situating political 
economic analyses of retransmission fees between institutional and structural accounts “builds a 
special depth and texture as individuals, corporations, and governmental agencies are 
systematically and structurally contextualized in retrospect” (Meehan 1986, 407).  The following 
essay begins by considering the historical emergence of retransmission fees and the motivations 
of corporate institutions behind their rise.  It proceeds to analyze how media entities have 
changed their corporate structure and behavior to best utilize the revenue streams retransmission 
fees offer.  Finally, the role of retransmission fees as a commodity and means of capital 
accumulation will be briefly considered.  The hope is that there will be more critical attention 
paid to retransmission fees moving forward. 
 
Data Collection 
Because the retransmission consent process is conducted between private parties and behind 
closed doors, access to conversations, decision-making and even the amount of the fees 
themselves are all opaque.  Data on the fees are collected by TV research firms such as SNL 
Kagan, but the full reports are behind a paywall and are prohibitively expensive – costing over 
$5000 at the time of this writing.  Instead, I used both academic and popular search engines to 
find third party references to the fees paid by specific channels, which were in the form of cost 
per subscriber per month (e.g. “How Much More Does ESPN Make in Affiliate Revenue than 
the Other Sports Networks?” 2016; Munson 2017).  I then found the total number of subscribers 
per channel and multiplied the monthly retransmission fee by the total number of channel 
subscribers to reach a monthly retransmission revenue estimate for the top 50 channels in the US 
(Neilsen data from: Bucholtz 2018; “Net Worth” 2017).2  Multiplying the monthly numbers by 
12 yielded an annual estimate of the total retransmission fee revenue across all channels in the 
U.S. television industry.3 
 
Assessing the role retransmission fees played on television programming and cable company 
structures was done through accessing trade press articles, newspaper interviews with corporate 
decision makers and investor reports.4  Such sources are, by definition, limited as what key 
figures say in public and mean in private may diverge substantially.  Nonetheless, they do 
provide a point of historical data and the public-facing side of corporate decisions and insight 
into the motivations and expectations of investors/capital (Corrigan 2018).     
 
 
A Note on Terms and Entities 
There are three overlapping terms that describe rights payments from distributors (cable and 
satellite companies) to programmers (TV networks) in the television industry: retransmission 
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fees, carriage fees and affiliate fees.  In the trade press and some investor reports these terms are 
used interchangeably and at other times they are not.  When they are treated separately, 
retransmission fees apply to the major broadcast networks, carriage fees apply to cable networks 
and affiliate fees are paid by local broadcast affiliates to their affiliated broadcast network (for 
instance, WCTV, a CBS-affiliated network in Tallahassee, Florida, would send payments to the 
CBS network for the rights to air CBS content).  In the interest of simplicity, we re-categorized 
each of the above as retransmission fees – fees paid to a programmer for the right to retransmit a 
broadcast signal, “independent of the copyright in the underlying content” (Balganesh 2007, 
1308). 
 
Must Carry, Retransmission Consent, and the Construction of the U.S. Television Market 
The roots of retransmission consent can be traced back to the Radio Act of 1927, although the 
language was codified in the Communication Act of 1934 (P. Parsons 2008).  Section 325(a) of 
the act not only forbade the broadcast of fraudulent distress signals, but also stated that no 
broadcast station may “rebroadcast the program or any part thereof of another broadcasting 
station without the express authority of the originating station” [47 U.S.C. 325].  This rule 
forbidding retransmission was complicated as, by the late 1950’s, community access antennas 
and cable television grew in popularity.  These community antennas were not seen as either a 
broadcast or a performance, so cable operators were not required to pay royalties nor obtain 
retransmission consent before distributing the television signals of major networks.  Pressure 
from broadcasters – leery of losing market power and control to cable operators - encouraged the 
FCC to consider regulating the fledgling cable industry (Bettig 1996, 122–24).  By 1974, the 
FCC passed must-carry rules which stated that cable operators “must carry” local and public 
television stations within the service area of a cable provider – the fear being that the national 
content distributed by cable providers would crowd out local stations and broadcasts (P. Parsons 
2008, 353).  By 1987, however, must-carry was ruled in violation of cable operators First 
Amendment protections (Century Communications Corporation v. FCC 1987).  Pressure from 
broadcasters (specifically the National Association of Broadcasters) sought a Congressional 
response to the changing television industry; specifically aiming for the establishment of must-
carry rules to protect the interests of broadcasters against those of cable operators.  A late attempt 
by the broadcast industry/lobby to re-establish must-carry was killed by the cable industry/lobby 
in 1990 (Goodman 2017).  A key point here is that the “television industry” was constituted by 
sets of competing corporate interests – specifically between broadcasters and cable operators - 
and different revenue streams beyond that of merely selling audiences to advertisers. 
 
By 1992, after a series of false starts and an overridden presidential veto, Congress passed the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Television Act (Cable Act).  The Cable Act, among 
other provisions, gave local broadcast stations the option to either a) guarantee carriage by 
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPD) or b) negotiate “retransmission consent” 
fees with MVPD for the right of television distributors to carry the station’s signal (Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act 1992, 1482).  Every three years stations 
could choose between either a must-carry provision (which meant MVPD were mandated to 
carry locally licensed stations) or opt for retransmission consent negotiations.  This arrangement 
satisfied the interests of broadcasters and the NAB, but even at its outset the cable industry was 
concerned that giving broadcasters the right to refuse retransmission rights would give stations 
undue leverage in the negotiation process (Parsons 2008, 393–94).  For example, major cable 
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networks like CNN or ESPN could threaten to withhold retransmission rights to force MVPD to 
settle on terms most favorable to major networks.  These terms could include either a per-
subscriber fee to be paid by the MVPD to the network, or (as was often the case in the 1990s) an 
agreement by the MVPD to carry additional channels owned by the network.  Thus, in lieu of fee 
payments to ESPN or CNN, a MVPD may agree to carry the signals of ESPN 2 and CNN 
International.  Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000, MVPD were reluctant to pay any 
fees to networks, fearing that it would turn a profit-center (as many small cable TV networks 
were willing to pay money to MVPD in exchange for carriage) into a cost center (MVPD would 
have to pay “broadcast rents” to national networks).  
 
ESPN is a salient case study here, as the network has often functioned as a weathervane 
regarding the changing conditions of the cable television industry.  In the network’s infancy, for 
example, ESPN was paying MVPD to incentivize the carriage of ESPN content (Vogan 2015a, 
23).  This payment structure was common in the 1980s and 1990s and new cable networks were 
seeking to increase both the overall carriage by cable operators as well as carriage in the 
basic/most widely available cable packages. By 1983, however, ESPN “inverted” this 
commodity relationship by demanding $0.10 per subscriber per month from MVPD for the right 
to carry ESPN (ibid., 26). The immense popularity of live sports placed MVPD in a difficult 
position of wanting to broadcast highly demanded content without having to pay for the rights to 
it.  Without much sought-after live sports, MVPD ran the risk of losing subscribers.  A price of 
$0.10/subscriber seems modest, but this fee set a trend in the television industry as many other 
cable outlets subsequently looked to gather retransmission fees from MVPD.  For instance, in 
1987 Discovery Channel charged MVPD $0.02 - $0.05 per subscriber per month – with MVPD 
affiliated/vertically integrated with Discovery paying the lower fee (Chris 2007).  Food Network, 
struggling for carriage the early 1990s, initially its content for free to MVPD in exchange for 
airing the network to 80% of its subscribers (Ketchum 2007).5  By 2017 the network was 
charging $0.22/subscriber/month for its 92 million subscribers (“Net Worth” 2017). Thus, cable 
networks like ESPN (and eventually Food Network) saw the emergence of a dual-revenue stream 
in terms of television content; not only did they garner revenue from the sale of audiences to 
advertisers, they also began to receive retransmission fees paid by MVPD – or, “they got to have 
their cake and eat it too” (Vogan 2015b).  These fees were particularly desirable as they were 
associated with virtually zero additional expenditures and were immune from fluctuations in the 
advertising/up-front market.  Although the emergence of retransmission fees was a boon for 
major cable networks, both broadcasters and cable system operators (MVPD) pushed back.  
Cable providers saw increased expenses to purchase retransmission rights, while broadcast 
networks saw the dual revenue stream of cable networks and wondered why they were forced to 
give their television content away for free. As MVPD were increasingly leveraged into paying 
retransmission fees, their options were to either a) reduce their profit margins (and anger 
investors), or b) increase the cost of cable subscriptions (and risk angering consumers).  Befitting 
an ethos of shareholder primacy, cable and satellite companies began to pass on the additional 
costs of programming to consumers.  
 
However, the negotiation of retransmission fees did not always proceed smoothly.  MVPD 
(including cable operators, direct broadcast satellite providers, and telecommunication services), 
broadcast networks and cable networks frequently disagreed on fees.  Keeping in mind that 
                                                      
5	As	of	2017	Food	Network	charged	MVPD	$0.22	per	subscriber	(“Net	Worth”	2017)	
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retransmission terms are renegotiated every three years, television networks and MVPD had very 
different ideas about increases in fees.  In the early years of retransmission fees disputes were 
generally resolved behind closed doors, but as MVPD became increasingly frustrated with 
network demands, battles between content providers and distributors were taken public (Russo 
2011).  When negotiations broke down, each side would seek to blame the other - MVPD would 
blame networks for rising subscription costs while networks would blame MVPD for the failure 
to distribute the network’s signal.  For instance, in 2012 a public dispute arose between Dish 
Network and cable network AMC.  After a lengthy negotiation battle with Dish, AMC created a 
Youtube video contest titled: “Hey DISH, Where’s My AMC” in an effort to use Dish’s own 
customers (and the popularity of AMC’s tentpole Walking Dead franchise) as leverage at the 
retransmission bargaining table (Silverman 2012).  Dish Network senior vice president Dave 
Shull responded in a news release that “AMC Networks requires us to carry low-rated channels 
like IFC and WE tv to access a few popular AMC shows. The math is simple: it’s not a good 
value for our customers” (Stelter 2012).  The AMC blackout was resolved after two parties 
finally settled on a fee three months after the initial negotiation broke down.  The private nature 
of the negotiations make totals difficult, but in 2017 there were an estimated 213 blackouts 
stemming from failed retransmission fee negotiations (Schwindt 2016; “Broadcasters Shatter TV 
Blackout Record in 2017” 2018).  These blackouts pitted MVPD against cable networks in fierce 
competition not over commodity audiences, but over commodity broadcast property rights.  
Television networks were looking to leverage popular content to extract higher fees from 
MVPD, whereas MVPD were faced with the prospect of either paying escalating retransmission 
fees or losing content and/or subscriber revenue (either via cord-cutters or competition in the 
MVPD space from satellite, or more recently, online providers).  
 
Thus far, the analysis of retransmission fees has focused on two entities within the television 
industry – multichannel video programming distributors and cable networks.  As retransmission 
revenue continued to grow (particularly after 2005), two new figures emerged in the market – 
broadcast networks and local television stations.  As noted above, major broadcast networks 
lusted after the dual revenue stream of their cable counterparts.  Rising fees saw broadcast 
executives and shareholders questioning why they seemed to be operating under a different set of 
market conditions from their cable counterparts (Gerbrandt 2010).  Additionally, it is worth 
noting here that broadcast networks generally do not own the equipment and hardware necessary 
to send their signals to MVPD – for that they turn to local television stations that are licensed to 
carry that networks’ signal.  These licensed stations are referred to as affiliates (if owned by a 
company other than the TV network) or owned-and-operated stations (if owned by the TV 
network).  Both the broadcaster’s desire for retransmission revenue, and the emerging 
profitability of broadcast networking affiliates, played a key role in the development of 
retransmission fees as a substantial non-advertising revenue source in the television industry 
(Edwards & Lowry 2010; Gessner 2013).  By the mid 2000s, major broadcast networks (ABC, 
CBS, NBC, Fox) were willing to forego “must-carry,” in favor of entering into negotiations with 
MVPD – largely motivated by obtaining a piece of the steadily rising retransmission fees 
collected by cable TV networks.  
 
However, unlike their cable counterparts, broadcasters had a problem – their content was 
available for free over the public airwaves via local affiliated TV stations. How could the major 
TV networks convince MVPD to pay for rights to carry a broadcast signal when that signal was 
7
Heresco and Figueroa: Over the Top: Retransmission Fees and New Commodities in the U.S.
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2020




non-exclusive?  The major networks took two paths.  The first, if the local stations were owned 
by the broadcast network (owned-and-operated, or O&O), was to let the major broadcast 
networks negotiate with MVPD regarding retransmission consent fees.  This was a more 
lucrative option, but most of the O&O stations existed in large metropolitan areas. In smaller 
markets, broadcast networks relied on affiliated (independently owned) stations to distribute 
network content.  Historically, broadcast networks paid local TV stations for carriage – with 
broadcast networks essentially trading prime-time programming to local affiliates in exchange 
for network advertising time (Flint 2012; Stelter 2011).  Starting in the late 2000’s, however, 
broadcast networks began to demand “reverse-comp” from their local station affiliates – money 
paid from the affiliate to the broadcast network, reversing (thus, “reverse”-comp) the historical 
flow of payment (Pomerantz 2009).  Broadcast networks eyed more consistent revenue streams 
(particularly following the 2008 financial crisis) and sought to capitalize on the popularity of 
prime-time programming to extract additional revenue from the larger television markets.  CBS 
president Les Moonves stated that: “If a station is looking at what’s really bringing in the money, 
it’s the N.F.L., it’s ‘American Idol,’ it’s ‘CSI,’ it’s the prime-time strength . . . It’s not the local 
news or, you know, ‘Regis and Kelly’ at 9 a.m., you know, that’s bringing in the big bucks” (qtd. 
in Stelter, 2011).  Broadcast networks have consistently sought a 50-50 split with their affiliated 
stations regarding collected retransmission fees (Napoli 2011; Farrell 2018).  Since 2012, the 
broadcast networks have also pushed for the right to negotiate retransmission fees on behalf of 
their affiliated stations – in an effort to both justify their “take” of the fees and to leverage 
economies of scale to extract more concessions/revenue from MVPD.   
 
The point here is not to recount the entirety of the relationship between broadcast networks and 
TV stations, but rather to introduce the idea that broadcast stations (and their cable counterparts) 
no longer need to rely on selling audiences to advertisers as a means of capital accumulation.  
Broadcasters have three primary revenue streams – selling audiences, collecting retransmission 
fees from O&O local stations directly, and collecting reverse-comp revenue from affiliated 
stations. For a sense of scale regarding the growth of broadcaster’s retransmission fees, in 2006 
the major broadcast networks collected approximately $215 million in retransmission revenue.  
By 2016 that figure reached $7.7 billion, whereas in that same time span prime-time viewership 
of broadcast networks had dropped by 52% (Fernandez 2016). Rising fees then were not driven 
by overall viewership, but rather by a few “tentpole” shows/licenses on each network and the 
leverage that content gave broadcast networks in the retransmission negotiations (what cable 
company would risk losing rights to NFL games, This Is Us, or The Voice?).  Retransmission 
fees across the television industry, including both broadcast and cable networks, totaled 
approximately $45 billion in 2017, while total TV advertising spending in the U.S was 
approximately $71 billion (Friedman 2017).  In aggregate, retransmission fees made up 
approximately one-third of the total revenue in the U.S. television market, although for many 
individual cable channels the ratio was substantially higher. 6  CNN, MSNBC and Fox News, for 
example, brought in more revenue through retransmission fees than through the sale of audiences 
to advertisers - $2,686,300,000 in fees vs $1,947,700,000 in advertising, collectively (Matsa 
2017).   
 
Before moving on to a discussion of the larger television market in the U.S., it is worth restating 
that retransmission fees were “created” by an act of Congress; it is nowhere written that they will 
                                                      
6	A	more	complete	set	of	revenue	figures	is	provided	in	the	appendix	
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exist in perpetuity.  Recent lobbying efforts have pitted the NAB against pay TV operators and 
MVPD as numerous attempts have been made to introduce legislation that would upend the 
retransmission consent process and resulting fees (Johnson 2013; Eggerton 2018).  The stakes of 
the analysis and the purpose of providing a brief history of retransmission fees is to revisit the 
specific structure of the television industry and the commodities that circulate through it.  
Attention to the commodity audience has long dominated discussions of capital accumulation in 
the television industries to the exclusion of more specific and contextual mechanisms.   
 
The New Monetization Engine 
Beyond being a revenue stream, retransmission fees also help explain organizational strategies in 
the contemporary US television industry.  As Tom Evens argues: “changing economic conditions 
have urged broadcasters to look at alternative and more stable income sources.  The golden years 
of free-to-air television and detergent commercials may have come to an end so broadcasters 
have to look for diversification of activities and alternative revenue streams” (2013, 183).  
Diversification, in this case, has included not merely the absorption of retransmission fees as a 
“free” revenue stream, but in some ways a reshaping of the larger television industry in an effort 
to capitalize on this emergent source of revenue.   The growth of niche cable networks and 
“blockbuster” content, the push toward vertical and horizontal integration in the industry, as well 
as MVPD responses to revenue squeezes are all clarified when see through the lens of 
retransmission fees. 
 
Niche Networks and Blockbuster TV 
One of the more straightforward responses to the steady increase in retransmission fees was the 
growth of niche cable networks; narrowly programmed networks that emerged as an efficient 
way to deliver audiences with specific demographic/psychographic profiles to advertisers.  Prior 
to the emergence of retransmission revenue, the fundamental economic question of any new 
network was whether advertising revenue (income) would be sufficient to pay for content 
acquisition, production, and staffing (expenses).  Retransmission fees not only added a second 
revenue source for cable networks, but also help explain why many niche networks developed 
between roughly 2005 and 2017.  Niche networks could capitalize on ever-growing channel 
options and demand for variety among MVPD to extract valuable retransmission revenue from 
cable and satellite operators.  For historical context, in 1994 the average number of cable 
networks available to subscribers was 40.  By 2005 that number had increased to 70 and by 2015 
it had increased again to 180 (Bazinet, Singlehurst, Rollins, May & O’Neill 2015). The growth in 
the number of cable networks did not correspond with a growth in the number of networks 
watched, however. Television viewers have consistently watched between 17 and 20 channels 
since the 1990s (Bazinet, Singlehurst, Rollins, May & O’Neil 2015; Snider 2016). If the growth 
in the number of cable networks is not attributable to new viewing patterns (audience demand), it 
stands to reason that it is a supply-side consideration.  More specifically, the double-sided 
revenue streams made cable networks immensely profitable.  As Bazinet et al point out, “in the 
last seven years – from 2007–2014 – cable networks accounted for 81% of revenue growth and 
73% EBITDA growth within the entire US media sector” (2015, 9).   
 
While some of this earnings growth was driven by advertising, we should not dismiss the role 
that retransmission fees played.  Bazinet et al, in a Citi report on investment opportunities in the 
U.S. television market, contended the following: 
9
Heresco and Figueroa: Over the Top: Retransmission Fees and New Commodities in the U.S.
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2020




   
What makes cable network content valuable isn’t the content, per se.  Rather, it’s   
 what a smart client of ours calls the ‘monetization engine’ supporting the cable   
 network business model.  That is, [retransmission] fees – sold in bundles – roll in   
 even if a show isn’t very good.  That’s hard to beat (2015, 18). 
 
Retransmission fees, as a monetization engine, encouraged the creation of new cable networks 
and programming – from college athletic conference channels like Big 10 and SEC networks to 
Oprah Winfrey’s OWN channel.  Each network could expect consistent revenue in the form of 
fees regardless of the success of any individual program.  The bundled structure of cable content 
also meant that networks included as part of a bundle could rely on retransmission revenue so 
long as demand remained high for the most watched channel(s) in the bundle.  Oprah Winfrey, 
for instance, converted her profitable daytime talk show into the Oprah Winfrey Network 
(OWN).  The OWN network, a 50-50 partnership between Winfrey and Discovery 
Communication, would take the place of the flagging Discovery Health Channel in cable channel 
lineups.  This move allowed Oprah to transmute her one-hour show into a 24-hour network, 
including editorial control and stable retransmission income.   The partnership also allowed 
Discovery to leverage its lifestyle television holdings (Discovery networks, Scripps networks, 
and OWN) in retransmission negotiations. 
 
The case of the OWN network is also instructive in that “must have” television programming can 
drive retransmission fees for an entire channel, network of channels, or MVPD bundle.  For 
instance, The Walking Dead on AMC or Oprah’s content on the OWN network spurs demand for 
that network – the other programming the network carries is of little consequence in terms of 
retransmission negotiation.  In the context of retransmission fees, it may be better to have one 
prestigious show in high demand than a catalog full of moderately successful (in terms of 
audience commodity sales) television programming.  A 2017 estimate suggests that high end 
cable dramas may have a budget of $5 – 7 million dollars per episode, a figure that would be 
nearly impossible to recoup in advertising revenue alone (Ryan & Littleton 2017).  However, 
considered in the context of retransmission fees this outlay makes sense as it positions television 
networks with hit programming as a necessity for cable providers and offers a great deal of 
leverage at the RTC negotiating table. For cable networks (such as OWN), the growing 
importance of retransmission consent revenue began to decouple the financial health of a 
network from the advertising revenue it garnered.  To be sure, advertising was still a major 
consideration, but it was not the only, or even primary, consideration as some cable networks 
saw retransmission revenue surpass advertising sales (Matsa 2017; “Retrans Revenue Share 
Expands In Latest U.S. TV Station Industry Forecast” 2016).  Prestige TV could function as 
something of a loss leader, driving up demand for the network and accompanying retransmission 
fees – even if the cost of producing a show was not recouped in advertising sales. 
 
Niche networks emerged as cable network conglomerates were looking to expand channel 
portfolios and cash in on the leverage of their most popular programming. MVPD, leery of rising 
costs and eroding subscribers/cord-cutting, began to push back in the mid-2010s by dropping 
some of the flagging networks while other underperforming networks have been swept up in 
waves of mergers (Kang 2015; Littleton & Holloway 2017; Niemann 2017). Of course, not all 
niche networks have struggled.  One of the primary drivers of rising retransmission fees has been 
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the costs of live sports programming – the “most valuable content on the planet,” according to 
Adam Ware, head a digital media at Tennis Channel (James 2016).  As television viewing habits 
change – both for generational and technological reasons – live sports viewing has remained one 
of the most reliable mechanisms of live TV audience agglomeration at a time when cable 
subscribers have been moving away from expensive cable bundles.  During a 2018 earnings call, 
Lachlan Murdoch trumpeted Fox’s focus on live sports as a key driver of growth: “We see great 
potential to increase our retransmission revenue quite aggressively . . . Obviously, there’s the 
focus and investment in sports with the new NFL Thursday night packages, but also being a 
more focused company with fewer channels in our bundle [we] will be able to drive our retrans 
for the stations quite aggressively” (Frankel 2018). 
 Capitalizing on the draw of live sports, there has been a steady push over the previous 
decade for sports leagues, and individual teams, to join the retransmission fee revenue train.  
Notable among these are the major US sports leagues (NBA TV, NFL Network, NHL Network, 
MLB Network), college athletic conferences (SEC, Big 10, PAC 12) and popular teams or 
regions (YES Network, Lakers TV, LA Dodgers Network, Fox Sports [regional networks]).    
 
Network Year Founded Ownership Structure 
NFL Network 2003 Wholly owned NFL 
NBA TV (1999) rebranded 2003 Owned by NBA, operations 
turned over the Turner 
Broadcasting, subsidiary of 
Time Warner, in 2008 
NHL Network 2007 Split between NHL and 
Comcast Cable System (owner 
of NBC Sports Network) 
MLB Network 2008 Split between MLB and 
DirecTV, Comcast, Charter 
Communications, and Cox 
Communications  
SEC Network 2013 Wholly owned by ESPN 
Big 10 2007 Split between Fox 
Entertainment Group (Fox 
Sports) and the Big 10 
conference 
PAC 12 Network 2012 Wholly owned by PAC 12 
Conference 
YES Network (NY Yankees) 2002 Split between 20th Century 
Fox and Yankee Global 
Enterprises. 
 
Two notable elements of the above table are 1) that all of the networks were created with a 11-
year period, and 2) that the ownership of these networks often includes MVPD corporations or 
subsidiaries.  MVPD, seeing the writing on the wall with regard to retransmission negotiations 
and leverage, considered ownership stakes in sports networks as a convenient hedge against both 
rising retransmission fees and shrinking subscriber numbers.  Regarding the former, controlling 
both production and distribution helped ensure there would be no blackouts of telecasts and that 
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retransmission negotiations proceeded smoothly.  Regarding the latter, if, as television analysts 
contend, live sports is the future of cable television, control over live sports broadcasts can help 
slow the melt as younger generations turn away from traditional television distribution models.  
“Control,” in this context means either the payment of fees for exclusive distribution rights to 
highly coveted live sports programming, and/or an ownership stake in the sports leagues 
themselves to prevent being “crowded out” of the live sports programming market.   
 
Niche networks had an obvious appeal in the delivery of audiences to advertisers, but that alone 
doesn’t explain the proliferation of networks since 2000.  If examined within the context of 
retransmission fees, however, both media conglomerates’ enthusiasm in creating new networks, 
and MVPD’s recent reluctance to continue carrying them, becomes far easier to understand.  The 
squeeze that is being put on MVPD is coming from two sides – on one is the rising costs of 
programming (including retransmission fees) and on the other is the emergence of virtual 
multichannel video programming distribution, which are peeling off subscribers and providing 
downward pressure on profit margins.  Virtual multichannel video programming distributors 
include Sling TV, Youtube TV, and Hulu Live, provide multiple channels of television content 
over the internet (i.e. without providing their own infrastructure to transmit signals).   
 
What network executives called a “monetization engine” was for MVPD and content distributors 
a substantial, and growing, expense (Bazinet, Singlehurst, Rollins, May & O’Neill 2015, 18).  
For an MVPD not carrying networks that contain highly sought-after programming threatens 
either the ire of customers, or, more seriously, subscription melt as users flee to streaming or 
competitors’ services.  At the 2017-2018 rate, retransmission fees have been increasing by 
approximately 8% per year, while MVPD average revenue per unit lagging at 3% (Bazinet, 
Singlehurst, Rollins, May & O’Neill 2015, 45).  In other words, retransmission fee increases 
have been outracing rising cable subscription costs and cutting into the gross margins of MVPD.  
This downwards pressure has encouraged further waves of consolidation in TV distribution, both 
at the national and local level (Matsa & Potter 2014; Fischer 2018).    
 
Retransmission, Integration, and MVPD Responses 
Integration has long been a feature of the media industries with high fixed costs and the sale of 
risky creative goods making economies of scale and scope particularly appealing.  However, the 
specific rationales that drove mergers have changed over time.  Parsons (2003) argued that in the 
1960s consolidation was driven by the high fixed costs of cable infrastructure in major markets, 
whereas by the 1990s consolidation was motivated by the perceived synergies of new digital 
technologies. 
 
 Emerging technologies, especially digital communication, were seen as leading   
 the world’s electronic media systems toward a set of seamless businesses that   
 would provide cable, telephone, and other key communication services.    
 Competition between  previously disparate industries, especially cable and   
 telephone, each providing such integrated systems and services, would in theory   
 encourage development of the bundled consumer products and keep costs low.   
 Within this view, the conventional wisdom was that only companies of size   
 would survive (2003, 36).  
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The logic for consolidation is inherently linked to challenges of capital accumulation in the 
industry – even if these specific characteristics of those challenges change alongside economic, 
legal and political shifts.  As the retransmission revenue began to flow to programmers in the 
early 2000s, MVPD began to consider the purchase of “upstream” organizations as a strategy to 
control both costs and content.  Ji (2015), for example, argued that “[MVPD] with ownership ties 
to cable program networks [have] a tendency to favor its own affiliated networks  . . . and 
exclude unaffiliated rival networks” (p. 186).  The promotion/restriction of content in this case 
not only allows MVPD to ward off competition (from traditional cable or newer streaming 
services), but also to manage their programming expenses – no retransmission negotiations need 
take place if both the programmer and the MVPD are within the same conglomerate.   
 
The purchase of NBCUniversal by Comcast and the 2018 purchase of Time Warner by AT&T 
provide specific sites at which to examine the how retransmission fees have motivated vertical 
integration within the television industry.  In the case of the much-publicized buyout of 
NBCUniversal by cable giant Comcast, the move was motivated not just by Comcast’s desire to 
capitalize on new distribution technologies (streaming, digital purchasing), but also by a desire to 
house programming and distribution under the same corporate tent.  For Comcast, 
   
[m]ost of NBC’s value is in its lucrative cable channels — USA, Bravo, SyFy,   
 CNBC and MSNBC. These networks, along with the channels that Comcast will   
 contribute to the joint venture, will compose 82 percent of the company’s cash   
 flow . . . NBC has been mired in fourth place among the major broadcast    
 networks, and the economics of the broadcast television business has deteriorated   
 in recent years amid declining overall ratings and a decline in advertising. By   
 contrast, cable channels have continued to thrive because they rely on a steady   
 stream of subscriber [retransmission] fees from cable companies like Comcast   
 (Arango 2009). 
 
When news of the proposed buyout was publicized a number of Comcasts’ rivals and public 
interest organizations appealed the FCC to impose conditions on the deal (Gardner 2012; Flint 
2010).  Beside concern over program access rule and net neutrality, many comments submitted 
to the FCC in opposition to the merger centered on issues of monopoly control over content and 
the leverage that would give Comcast in the retransmission negotiation process (Nagesh 2011; 
Schatz & Schechner 2010). Independently owned local NBC stations, satellite TV providers, and 
the U.S. Telecomm Association (representing Verizon and AT&T) urged restriction on 
retransmission leverage, arbitration mechanisms for retransmission disputes and FCC 
interventions “that would curb Comcast's ability to use NBC stations' negotiations to thwart 
competing TV distributors” (Schatz and Schechner 2010).  Such concerns were far from 
outlandish, and Comcast’s control of both upstream and downstream content has given them 
substantial power in both the programming and distribution markets – with both sides seeing 
marked upticks in revenue and stock price since the merger (Fraser 2013). 
 
 
More recently, AT&T, parent company of MVPD DirecTV, purchased Time Warner and its 
extensive holdings in the television programming space for $85 billion (Kang, Lee, and 
Cochrane 2018).  The deal gave AT&T/DirecTV controlling access to HBO, CNN, TBS, and 
13
Heresco and Figueroa: Over the Top: Retransmission Fees and New Commodities in the U.S.
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2020




TNT, some of the most valuable properties in cable television.  “Owning valuable programming  
. . . gives AT&T more influence over what the ‘future of media" looks like . . . means [o]ther 
companies will have to negotiate with AT&T to gain long-term licenses for channels like TNT 
and Cartoon Network” (Stelter 2016).  Leverage over the “cash cow” that is cable television 
means not just access to commodity audiences or control over distribution platforms, but also 
over the rights to content and the associated retransmission fees (Bartz 2018).  Justice 
Department lawyer Craig Conrath argued that “AT&T also would be able to use the leverage to 
hinder the growth of online competitors, such as Google Inc.'s YouTube TV and Dish Network's 
Sling TV” (Puzzanghera 2018).  By purchasing such cable programming, not only was AT&T 
able to eliminate retransmission payments for said content, but they could also threaten to 
withhold their own networks from competitors, or charge rates in excess of value to force out 
competition.  Of course, retransmission payments are not the only motivating factor here, as 
AT&T has argued that their data-gathering at the MVPD level can help programming in terms of 
both ad sales and more accurately predicting audience demand (Womack 2018).  Nonetheless, 
both advertising and retransmission control/revenue played a major role in the purchase and 
continued pushes for vertical integration between distributors and programmers.   
 
As vertically-integrated firms and international conglomerates have brought their considerable 
size to bear at the negotiation table, smaller programming networks and stations groups have also 
seen horizontal integration as a strategy to avoid being bought up or crowded/priced out of the 
television marketplace.  When Discovery Communication, for example, moved to buy the 
Scripps family of cable networks, analysts and Discovery leaders noted that this would grant 
Discovery increased leverage in ongoing retransmission fee negotiations (Hayes 2018).  On the 
local broadcast side of the industry, conglomerate station groups like Nexstar and Sinclair have 
been buying up local broadcast stations in an effort to resist programmers’ demands for steadily 
increasing fees (Depp 2017; Ember and Merced 2017; Littleton 2017). Both local broadcast 
stations and MVPD found themselves being squeezed by rising retransmission rates and falling 
subscription rates.  Consolidation, though endemic to the media industries, was here driven by 
the process and revenue of retransmission consent as much as corporate synergies and co-
branding opportunities.  As Gomes-Caseres argued, “all of these cable company mergers have 
given them more power in dealing with the programming companies . . . now it makes sense for 
the programming companies to realign. Everybody is looking at everyone else and going around 
the dance chairs before the music stops” (ctd. in James 2017).  
 
The Drive to Consolidation and Integration has Furthered the Move Toward Gigantism Within 
the Television Industry 
While programmers may see retransmission fees as a profit center, MVPD see the fees, at least 
nominally, as a substantial operating cost.  Aside from vertical and horizontal integration, cable 
companies have adopted three general approaches to dealing with the pressures put on them in 




Consider Cloo, for instance, an NBCUniversal-affiliated network that aired reruns of other NBC 
programming with no original program of its own.  Cloo began as “something of a placeholder in 
2006, when cable and satellite subscriptions were still on the rise,” but after Spectrum cable 
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system dropped the channel in late 2016, Cloo only reached a little over 8 million homes (Crupi 
2017).  NBCUniversal, looking to trim their cable offerings in anticipation of a tighter cable 
marketplace, were not willing to leverage their other cable properties to encourage MVPD to 
carry the network. Crupi, writing about the demise of Cloo, on the decline of niche networks: 
 
 Simply put, the networks that lag on the distribution front and regularly scratch in  
 the Nielsen ratings have almost zero in the way of leverage with their distributors.  
 Barring the negotiation of a drastically reduced carriage fee, these disadvantaged   
 nets pose little threat to an operator looking to muscle them out of its channel lineup.  
 And as cord-cutting/-shaving continues to erode the traditional distribution model,  
 only the must-carry nets will be invited to board the virtual life rafts that are the so- 
 called ‘skinny bundles’ (2017). 
 
The dropping of channels like Cloo seems to work against the argument raised above regarding 
the rise of niche networks.  Two key points on this seeming contradiction.  First, if 
NBCUniversal was invested in the survival of the network that could have used the rest of their 
cable network catalog as leverage to “encourage” MVPD to continue carrying the network.  The 
second point is that even if the cable programmers wanted to expand their cable offerings into 
perpetuity, the corporate heft of MVPD giants like Comcast and AT&T mean they can push back 
against cable networks’ demands for both more fees and carriage of affiliated channels.  In the 
case of Cloo, its initial carriage is explained by consolidation in the TV programming industry, 
as NBCUniversal was able to leverage its control over content to encourage MVPD to carry the 
network.  At the other end of Cloo’s lifespan, it is consolidation in the MVPD market that gives 
distributors power to resist the efforts of programmers to leverage more content into television 
bundles.        
 
As Crupi noted above, the emergence of “skinny bundles” allow MVPD to trim un(der)wanted 
networks from their cable offerings in the name of consumer demand.  These “skinny bundles” 
give consumers a choice in what specific television works they will receive – usually including 
local broadcast networks and 10-20 networks that the user chooses.  These plans offer a pricing 
discount for consumers and MVPD (keeping in mind the language of the retransmission fee 
transaction: $ per subscriber per month).  If a portion of the MVPD subscriber base does not 
choose a network to be included in their skinny bundle, the MVPD need not pay the 
programmers for the rights to that content for that subscriber.  Skinny bundles, as a quasi-a la 
carte TV subscription package – may be as much a response to managing rights fees as a 
response to consumer demand for cheaper cable packages. 
 
Retransmission fees were, from the beginning, a legislative response to a market problem; both 
the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the National Cable and 
Telecommunications Association (NCTA) have been lobbying for FCC intervention in the 
retransmission consent process (Hearn 2007; Jacobson 2019).  In response to FCC calls for 
comment, the MVPD backed lobbies (like the American Cable Association) has come up against 
the NAB in complaints, and counter-complaints, about good-faith negotiations, market 
competition and government intervention on behalf of MVPD (American Cable Association 
2017; Lieberman 2016).  Bettig (1996) offers a compelling instrumentalist/institutional account 
of the history of retransmission consent as the result of corporate lobbying.  The specific details 
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of the lobbying efforts are beyond the scope of this project – and are indeed ongoing - but do 
suggest that legislative appeals will continue to be a popular tactic to address falling rates of 
profit and/or shifting capital flows in the television industry.   
 
New TV Commodities? 
When speaking of the television commodity it is most often associated with the audience 
commodity thesis stemming from the work of Smythe (Smythe 1951, 1977, 2006a). Smythe’s 
work, and the intellectual fire it lit within the political economy of communication, shaped 
critical analysis of television for a generation.  Smythe, as well as those who responded to his 
Blindspot piece, began their analysis of the television industry by focusing on the commodity; an 
object of analysis that clarifies the buyer/seller relationship (including what, exactly, is being 
purchased) and offers a starting point for a consideration of surplus value (Meehan 1984; Jhally 
& Livant 1986b; Caraway 2011; McGuigan & Manzerolle 2014).   
 
New technologies, TV industry norms, and legal frameworks have changed since Smythe’s work 
was originally published, however.  Although industrial and technological changes have not 
fundamentally altered the applicability of the commodity audience concept, they have introduced 
new commodity forms and mechanisms for capital valorization.7 As Amanda Lotz argued: 
 
 Television criticism in era of such multifaceted norms for the medium requires   
 attention to more than its programs and distribution form; it must also consider   
 the specific economic model that undergirds distinctions among broadcast    
 networks, basic cable, and subscription channels – as each circumscribes a   
 particular nexus of art and commerce.  Such criticism must interrogate how   
 institutional characteristics contribute to programming possibilities because the   
 type of programming provider and specified institutional context yield particular   
 constraints and abilities (2007, 89).   
 
As outlined above, the audience commodity may be a primary source of revenue today for 
broadcast networks like NBC, but advertising rates constitute less than half of net revenue for a 
number of cable networks, and virtually none of the revenue for subscription channels (HBO, 
Cinemax) and streaming services (Netflix, Hulu “no-commercials” plan).  To state that the 
audience is the commodity, or even the primary commodity, sold by television pays insufficient 
attention to, in the words of Lotz, the institutional characteristics and contexts of television 
today.8  Even if we remain within the context of “advertiser-supported” television, it is 
inaccurate to say that audiences are the primary commodity sold by cable news networks, for 
instance, when the majority of those stations revenues comes instead of retransmission fees.  
Commodity audiences are still a major driver of network decisions within the television industry, 
but an empirical analysis of the contemporary TV industry must take into account the role of 
these fees in new strategies of capital accumulation. 
 
                                                      
7	Retransmission revenue in 2017, across both broadcast and cable, totaled approximately $45 
billion dollars vs an estimate total advertising revenue of $70 billion.  See appendix for details 
8	A similar situation holds true today in the “radio” industry as well, with both Sirius/XM and 
Spotify offering plans that allow users to access advertising-free audio content in exchange for a 
monthly subscription fee.   
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The current era of retransmission fees finds signal distribution rights as a commodity of growing 
importance in the television industry (see Balganesh 2007).  Radia argued that “the FCC noted in 
its first cable rulemaking following the 1992 Cable Act’s enactment that ‘Congress created a  
new communications right in the broadcaster’s signal, completely separate from the 
programming’” (2015, 255).  Retransmission consent, Radia continued, “exists in addition to, not 
in lieu  of, the exclusive rights in audiovisual works recognized by the Copyright Act” (2015, 
255).  The Cable Act of 1992, alongside new technologies, created a new commodity, and new 
market, for negotiation between TV networks and MVPD for the acquisition of signal property 
rights (Streeter 1996; Balganesh 2007).  The sellers of this commodity are television networks 
(e.g. ESPN, NBC), and the purchasers are multichannel video programming distributors (e.g. 
Comcast, Spectrum, DirecTV).9  The commodity structure of retransmission fees is obscured, 
however, in that the fees function as commodified access to ostensibly public goods – products 
not diminished by the use of another (see Baker 2002, 15).  Indeed, in the case of NBC, the 
television signal is both a public good (non-exclusive and free to receive over-the-air) and at the 
same time a privatized commodity that generates billions of dollars per year for the network.  
Owen (2011) contended: 
 
 “Retransmission” in effect created yet another new property right, and assigned   
 ownership of the right to TV network affiliates, the largest and most important of   
 which are owned by the broadcast networks themselves . . . Unlike program   
 producers and networks, TV stations do nothing to “earn” this right, and the   
 benefits to them are not rewards for innovation or production of valuable services.  
 The economic value of a retransmission right comes solely from the ability of its   
 owner to extract cash (or carriage) from cables systems and other multi-channel   
 video program distributors (MVPDs) (3).  
 
To help clarify the issue of the retransmission commodity it may be useful to consider two 
examples using 2017 data; ESPN (charged distributors $7.21 per subscriber) and NBC (charged 
distributors approximately $1.50 per subscriber).   
 
ESPN, the long-time leader in the retransmission fee market, paid approximately $8 billion 
dollars in 2017 for rights fee regarding the broadcast of live sporting events (Thompson 2017).  
The popularity of live sports and the “digital enclosure” of live-sports broadcasts have rapidly 
escalated the costs of exhibition rights. For ESPN the $8 billion dollars was recouped through a 
double revenue stream – the selling of “demogenic” (McAllister 1996) audiences which live 
sports aggregate (audience commodity) and the selling of exhibition rights to MVPD such as 
Comcast and DirecTV.  ESPN, via cable carriers, reaches approximately 90 million households, 
and charges those carriers $7.21/subscriber/month.  The exhibition rights revenue stream thus 
earned ESPN approximately $7.8 billion dollars per year; and because these fees are negotiated 
over three-year terms, these fees are not subject to periodic fluctuations in the advertising 
markets or crises in the larger economy – thus providing a relatively low-risk, high-reward home 
for capital accumulation.  
                                                      
9	Although MVPD also reach agreements with cable and broadcast networks for the “carving 
out” of local advertising time slots (the revenue of which goes to the MVPD), this revenue 
contribution “has been a drop in the bucket compared with subscriber revenues” (qtd. in Poggi 
2014).     	
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On the other side of the simplified ESPN transaction are MVPD ranging from global 
conglomerates like Spectrum/Time Warner to small local or independent cable carriers.  These 
MVPD pay ESPN $7.21/subscriber/month for the right to carry/transmit ESPN content to 
subscribing households.  MVPD, with a keen eye on profits and shareholder value, pass through 
the costs to consumers (irrespective of if subscribers actually watch ESPN or any other network) 
in the form of increased monthly cable bills.  Not only does this suggest that the “free lunch” of 
TV programming isn’t free, it also indicates that the dynamic of revenue generation via 
viewership is changing.  As another example, consider the case of the Weather Channel, which 
in 2014 asked for a $.01 increase in retransmission fees despite a 20% drop in ratings (Sahagian 
2014).  Viewers may demand access to the channel in case of weather emergencies but may only 
tune in to the channel a handful of times per year.  Nonetheless, the demand for access to 
channels drive up retransmission revenue even if the day-to-day or week-to-week ratings are 
weak.     
 
Returning to our commodity examples, NBC shares many of the same structural elements as 
ESPN– NBC charged MVPD approximately $1.50 per subscriber per month in 2017 for the 
rights to retransmit NBC content.  Recalling Lotz comments’ above, the institutional 
characteristics of NBC, as a broadcast network, lead to a number of important differences 
between the broadcast network and the ESPN example.  First, the NBC retransmission fee 
appears as a unique commodity in that the broadcast network still transmits its signal over-the-air 
for free. MVPD are thus, through the retransmission consent process, “forced” to pay for 
something that is available for free to consumers/citizens.  Second, major broadcast networks 
like NBC include both affiliated stations (often in smaller markets) and owned-and-operated 
stations (often in larger markets).  Prior to the year 2000, broadcast networks paid local stations – 
KXAS in Dallas, Texas or KUSA in Denver, Colorado, for example – in exchange for the 
airtime/audience commodity the broadcast network sold to advertisers.  Since the early 2000’s, 
however, “reverse comp” has seen local broadcaster-affiliated stations pay the broadcast 
networks a per-subscriber fee for the rights to air network content – often ranging between $0.25 
and $1.00 per subscriber/month (McCord 2014).  Instead of the broadcast network paying local 
TV stations for airtime/access to audiences, we now have a television market where broadcast 
networks like NBC can extract “programming rent” from their affiliated television stations and 
station groups.  This shift in revenue flows strongly suggests that the articulation of the television 
commodity, as a means of capital accumulation, goes beyond the purchasing of audiences and 
ratings and that new tools and attention is required to fully grasp the relationship of the television 
industry to capital investment, allocation, and accumulation.  
 
In the retransmission consent transaction both television networks and MVPD retransmission 
fees provide an opportunity for the valorization of capital.  For television networks, the creation 
and/or distribution of cultural goods places them at the nexus of a multi-billion dollar global 
entertainment marketplace. At these distributional bottlenecks, opportunities to extract surplus 
value out of cultural goods have multiplied; whereas the commodity audience was the primary 
means of capitalizing on broadcast television in the 1970s, today that commodity is either 
supplemented or supplanted by retransmission fees as well as a growing drive for direct 
subscription to networks by consumers (HBO Now, Netflix, Hulu Plus, ESPN+).  Increasing 
competition in the production space (via Youtube and user-generated and low-cost productions) 
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and the exhibition space (via cord-cutting, Sling TV, Amazon Video, Netflix, etc.) has situated 
the retransmission of signals as a commodity whose returns are growing in a television market 
that is seeing capital returns shrink as users, and advertising revenue, move online (Bazinet, 
Singlehurst, Rollins, May & O’Neill 2015). 
 
The emergence and steady increase in retransmission fees has created incentives for change on 
both side of the retransmission consent transaction. To be clear, these changes do not exist in a 
vacuum and the audience commodity remains a major factor in media industry decision making.  
However, retransmission fees, as a monetization engine of the contemporary television industry, 
hold a great deal of explanatory power regarding the structure of decision-making in and flow of 
capital through the television industry. 
 
Conclusion 
Retransmission fees have and will continue to reshape the television industry.  At an institutional 
level the fees have changed the logics and motivations of television programmers and 
broadcasters.  At a structural level the fees, as a monetization engine, have opened up capital 
accumulation strategies within the television industry beyond the commodity audience. 
Retransmission fees are thus important objects of study in that they are part of the economic 
logic that drives decision-making processes within the industry and influences the overall 
profitability of the industry.  Increased attention to new commodity formations in the television 
industry, retransmission fees among them, will offer valuable insights into the means through 
which capitalism continues to commodify creative work and leisure; specifically as new 
technologies and business models expand the reach of capital further into daily experiences.  
Retransmission fees are but one of a number of new revenue streams seized upon by capital 
amidst changing TV technologies and demographics.  Taking account of these changes is 
necessary if the critical scholarship about the television industry is to keep up with the 
substantial changes within it.  Otherwise, critical conversations about the television industry (or 
the media industries more broadly), become recitations of critical-correctness instead of 
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Cable	Networks	 $36,285,533,520	
	   
Broadcast	Networks		 $9,300,000,000	
	   
Total	Retrans.	Revenue	 $45,585,533,520	
	   
     
Total	Ad	revenue	 $70,000,000,000	
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